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Summary
The Sierra Leone Police Force has its origins in the British colonial administration
of the country. After Independence and with the consolidation of one-party rule the
force slid into disrepute. The outbreak of civil conflict in 1991 largely decimated
the force but the gradual restoration of peace provided an opportunity for police
reform. This research report covers the aspects of the political and institutional
environment that helped engender change, as well as constraints faced by the
reform agenda. It considers how the officers actually carried out the task at hand,
and shares lessons as to what reform tactics worked and which were less
successful. While several challenges remain, the reform programme, centred
around local needs policing has been largely successful, hinging on – among
other factors – the appointment of a British Inspector General of Police, perceived
to be neutral and above political machinations, supported by a core of reform-
minded officers; long-term external technical and financial assistance; and a
conducive political environment for change.
Keywords: Sierra Leone Police; SLP; police reform; security sector reform; SSR;
community policing; local needs policing.
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ex-combatants in West Africa. Freida has worked in Liberia and Sierra Leone on
various post-conflict reintegration and research projects. Her research interests
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1 Introduction
Much has been written and made of the process undertaken to reform Sierra
Leone’s Security Sector, after the country’s civil war ended in 2002 (Baker 2005;
Albrecht and Jackson 2009; Albrecht 2010). The Sierra Leone Police (SLP), in
particular, has received much attention. The purpose of this research report is not
to duplicate the insightful work already undertaken, but to document the process
from the perspective of Sierra Leonean Police officers who were key to the
reform. This includes Assistant Inspector Generals (AIGs) Joseph P. Chris Charley
(popularly known as Chris Charley), Kadi Fakondo and Elizabeth Turay, and
Lance Phoday, the head of the SLP’s Corporate Services.1 It covers the aspects
of the political and police force environment that helped engender change, as well
as constraints faced by the reform agenda. It considers how the officers actually
carried out the task at hand; and what reform tactics worked and which were less
successful. By sharing the experiences of those who were centrally involved in the
process it is hoped that the work may also provide insight and encouragement to
other police forces in Africa, who are trying to implement reform in their own
contexts amid similar constraints. 
The report begins with a background to the SLP, particularly in the run-up to the
country’s civil conflict, which began in 1991. It then documents the journey of the
SLP through the conflict, and the origins of the reform process. The experience of
reform is then discussed, punctuated by personal accounts. Finally we discuss the
challenges that the SLP still faces and conclude by drawing out some key lessons.
2 An introduction to and the
descent of the Sierra Leone Police
The Sierra Leone Police has its origin in the West Africa Frontier Force which,
between 1863 and 1906, was responsible for maintaining Britain’s colonial frontier
in the region, and maintaining law and order within the colony (essentially armed
resistance against Britain’s attempt to govern its Protectorate). From 1906 the
force was patterned on the model of the British Police force, becoming part of the
colonial civil service. Local officers were sent on various training programmes in
the United Kingdom and/or other colonial territories. The Force was considered
one of the best and well disciplined forces in colonial British West Africa.
The SLP gradually evolved over the years, and assumed the status of a
community security force, moving away from a role that mainly consisted of
defending British colonial interests. But it was a wholly colonial instrument, with its
senior ranks staffed by retired and seconded British officers. Between 1955–56,
the force was twice highly commended by Royal Commissions for its excellent
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handling of civil disturbances in Freetown (a general strike over the rising cost of
living and low pay) and in the provinces (by peasants against paramount chiefs,
who ruled at the pleasure of the colonialists). 
However, during this period, Sierra Leone began moving towards Independence,
with indigenous Africans beginning to take on significant roles in government and
the civil service. This included the Sierra Leone Police, and by the time of Sierra
Leone’s independence in 1961, the Sierra Leone Police Force had virtually been
Africanised. In 1963 the first Sierra Leonean Commissioner of Police was appointed. 
In 1964, Parliament passed an Act to consolidate and amend the ‘Law relating to the
Organisation, Discipline, Power and Duties of the Police’, setting up among other
things a Police Council, with the Minister of the Interior as Chairman. This Act further
defined the roles of the Sierra Leone Police Force as ‘the detection of crime and the
apprehension of offenders, the preservation of Law and Order, the protection of life
and property, and the due enforcement of all Laws and Regulations with which they
are directly charged’ (The Sierra Leone Police Act, Act No 4 of 1964). 
While before and shortly after Independence, the Police Force maintained a neutral
role in national politics, with the introduction of the One-Party Constitution in 1978,
this role was radically altered and compromised as a result of excessive political
machinations. The Commissioner of Police was then made a member of the ruling
party, a nominated Member of Parliament and a Cabinet Minister. This marked the
turning point in the history of the Police Force. The period also witnessed the
change of nomenclature from Commissioner of Police to Inspector General of
Police (IG), in 1985. This politicised position of the IG created imbalances in the
political allegiance of the force, which had far-reaching effects on police recruitment
procedures, management and administration of the force and promotion, which
consequently lowered ethical standards and morale, contributed to a breakdown of
discipline, and encouraged corruption. Of course, this heavily influenced public
perception and jeopardised police credibility among the citizenry.
Abuses, including early and untimely retirements, lack of opportunities for
promotion and training, and arbitrary transfers, all helped to lower the collective
morale of the police force. As a result, most police officers developed a
lackadaisical attitude towards their job, further eroding public confidence.
Subsequently police officers themselves lacked self-confidence and pride in their
profession. This collective lack of confidence found expression in indifferent
attitudes towards work, and even greater inefficiency and ineffectiveness in police
service delivery. Officers who had once drawn respect from the public and fear
from would-be offenders, were transformed into shabbily-dressed men and
women in faded uniforms who drew only scorn and mistrust from the community.
The government did make some attempts to reverse the decline of the police. For
instance, in 1984 a Cadet Officer Programme was instituted to promote recruitment
among university graduates. The policy may have been instigated by the then Head
of State, Siaka Stevens, in an attempt to limit the pressures exerted by members of
his party to provide jobs for their dependants. The programme ensured that
graduates would enter the police force at the relatively senior rank of Cadet Assistant
Superintendents. The recruitment was somewhat successful, with 18 graduates from
different backgrounds joining in the inaugural year. This squad had one woman
2 Interview on 20 December 2010. 
3 The Sierra Leone Civil War began in 1991, when a rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
invaded the country from neighbouring Liberia, supported by rebels fighting in that country’s civil war.
Although the RUF claimed they were fighting to free Sierra Leoneans from the ills of the Sierra Leone
government, the atrocities they committed belied their claims. In the face of the army’s inability to
defend the country, other parties, including community defence groups and mercenary organisations
were drawn into the war. After numerous failed peace agreements, two military coups and a transition
to democratic governance, the war finally ended in 2002.
11
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 70
among them, Kadi Fakondo, who had studied in the USA. The programme was
comprehensive, starting with six months basic training at the Police Training School
at Hastings, just outside the capital Freetown. Thereafter the graduates undertook
three-month rotations, working within the different divisions and sections –
administration; general duties; prosecutions; special branch; immigration (now
separate). They spent a total of three years rotating between different departments. 
The nature of their recruitment had made them household names. As Chris
Charley, one of the 18 notes:
The police force at this time was perceived to be an organisation that attracted
only mediocre people, so when the 18 of us came in, overnight we started
getting attention – the media zoomed in on the SLP to see how these new
graduates were getting on and what changes they would bring to the police
force… the limelight was on us; anything we did came within the public domain
and it has its own advantages and disadvantages.2
With regard to relations with other members of the police, however, there were
distinct disadvantages. In a context where instances abounded of sacking and threats
of dismissal for attempting to hold on to the basic competencies of the profession,
corruption-resistant police often found their promotion blocked. This included
many of those that had entered the force under the Cadet Officer Programme. At
one point, most of the cadre that entered in 1984 found their expected promotion
to the position of Deputy Superintendent of Police blocked for four years. They
found themselves extremely constrained. Again, according to Chris Charley: 
The people we met in the job felt threatened – they thought: they’re bringing in
these people who’re educated to come and lord them over us. Some of us…
spent the period [just] going around [and around]; we were submitted to a
whole lot of indignities, and a whole barrage of abuse, from old people who felt
we were coming to take their jobs from them. Some were very understanding
and helped us learn the job, but a lot of people frowned on us and didn’t want
to have anything to do with us… we were given all the odd jobs and we had to
succumb to this sort of treatment because… it was a regimentation job where
you have to be very respectful to your senior supervisors (ibid.).
With able-bodied and ambitious officers being held back, the force continued its
downward spiral. This general malaise was reflected in all aspects of civil service
and government conduct, considered to be one of the main contributing factors to
the Sierra Leone conflict that broke out in 1991. As direct representatives of a
corrupt and ineffective government, police personnel and buildings were a
particular target of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) insurgency.3
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 70
12
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the police played an important role in efforts to
combat the rebels, as some elements found themselves in the interesting position
of being better equipped to fight than the military: in the course of centralising
power, one wing of the police, the armed Internal Security Unit (ISU) had served
as President Stevens’ armed personal guard (which has also been referred to as
the ‘presidential death squad’ (Alpha 2010), strengthened and equipped at the
expense of both the army (who he purposefully kept weak to minimise the threat
of a coup d’état) and other police sectors. They had received specialist training in
Cuba and Eastern Europe. They were also battle-tested, having been drafted in to
crush the so-called Ndobusu insurgency in the mid-1980s, which rose up in
Pujehun District against politicians citizens felt were being imposed on them by
the one-party system.
In 1992, junior elements of the army staged a coup d’état against the Joseph
Momoh government, which had taken over one-party rule from Stevens in 1985.
After the coup it was clear that the sympathies of the military administration rested
with certain elements of the police, particularly those whose progress had been
restricted, and with whom they had close professional relations. This was
demonstrated by the new administration’s promotion of those officers that had been
constrained by the political machinations of the previous government to higher
ranks. In fact, many of the Cadet Officer squad were doubly promoted (i.e. they
skipped two ranks), and attained the position of Chief Superintendents of Police. 
This is not to say it was easy to maintain integrity under the army-led National
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) government. For instance, as second-in
command at Immigration, Charley fell foul of the regime for refusing to sanction
the sale of Sierra Leonean passports to Hong Kong businessmen, who were
worried about the implications of China resuming control of Hong Kong in 1997.
(At the time, Immigration fell under the Police, although it has since been moved
from police jurisdiction.) While this had been a sanctioned money-raising activity
to acquire ammunition and intelligence equipment to prosecute the war, the NPRC
government tried to expand the practice as a means of raising funds to turn itself
into a political party and contest the 1996 elections aimed at returning the country
to civilian democratic rule. Charley’s questioning of the regime’s agenda led to his
enforced leave of absence and replacement with a more permissive official.
By the outbreak of the civil war in 1991 then it was clear that the police were a
wholly demoralised and unprofessional force, heavily politicised and completely
out of step with the requirements of the population. The war gave some elements
a sense of purpose, fighting alongside the army, a relationship that strengthened
once the army assumed power in 1992. However, the military regime, enjoying the
windfalls associated with being in government, soon began to behave like their
predecessors, contributing to the further de-professionalisation of the Police, to
the extent that senior elements became involved in wide-scale forgery and
mismanagement. On the eve of Sierra Leone’s return to democratic multi-party
rule, the SLP was lacking in transparency, rife with corruption, devoid of legitimacy
and teetering on the brink of decay.
13
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3 The wind of change
As part of the move towards returning the country to democracy in 1996, several
advisory councils were set up to consider areas of governance that were
problematic. One such body was the Advisory Council on the Present and Future
Challenges of the Sierra Leone Police Force, headed by Dr Alhaji Tejan Kabbah, a
former lawyer and retired senior United Nations Development Programme official,
who would soon contest the presidency as the Sierra Leone People’s Party
(SLPP) candidate. 
According to the Council’s findings:
The image of the Sierra Leone Police has deteriorated in recent times from the
figure of a friend and social helper to a villain who is both ineffective and
corrupt. This image has consequently adversely affected the relationship
between the Police and the society. Poor people have been victims of this
preoccupation of the Police. This state of affairs had led to further loss of
confidence by the public in the Police Force resulting in the withdrawal of
public co-operation without which police work can hardly be successful.
(NPRC 1994) 
The Advisory Council further recommended an expanded role for the police, to
provide clearly defined jurisdiction to enable it to competently respond to various
criminal challenges:
? a restoration of the friendly image of the police, to ensure good community
relations
? the establishment of a planning unit that would be able to project the training
and equipment needs of the Police Force
? the establishment of a Police Council (a provision contained in Section 156 of
Act No 6 of the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone), chaired by the Secretary of
State for Internal Affairs, with powers to make recommendations to
government on policy issues affecting the police, including recruitment,
reassignment and promotion
? the decentralisation of the Police Force, with an Inspector General, a Deputy
Inspector General and a Senior Commissioner at the Headquarters in
Freetown, and Officers at each Provincial level, and at Divisional
Headquarters in the North, East, South and West, mandated to make
decisions and act on their own without reference to headquarters
? trimming of the SLP’s ranks, keeping only essential, positively functional
policemen, expanding the system of promotion and exams, and encouraging
the intake of capable university graduates by raising their points of admission
to Cadets Officers
? and equipping the force adequately to enable it operate efficiently, by
improving the emolument and conditions of service of officers.
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The recommendations were wide-ranging and comprehensive. When he was
elected as Sierra Leone’s President in 1996, as former chairman on the Police
Advisory Council, a priority of Kabbah’s was to ensure that the recommendations
of the Council were taken forward, more so as he had been elected under the
banner of standing for good governance, accountability and transparency. The
police would be critical partners in the consolidation of a budding democracy, and
in ensuring public security in a context where civil war was still being waged in
parts of the country. 
Kabbah’s government thus embarked on a process of reorganising the SLP along
the recommendations made by the Advisory Council. This included promoting a
new organisational structure, with emphasis on decentralising responsibility to local
levels, respecting the administrative organisation of the country; establishing a
more equal distribution of the human resources among the functional divisions in
charge of the various tasks of the Police; and increasing the human resource
capacity of the Sierra Leone Police, including by carefully screening and integrating
ex-combatants, as specified in the 1996 Abidjan Peace Accord. Negotiation of the
short-lived Accord began under the NPRC government, and was taken over by
Kabbah when he was elected to power. The rationale was that the ex-combatants,
exhibiting some degree of discipline, and a military background, could rapidly
receive regular Police Training and be deployed within the force to strengthen it.
Such recruitment was also considered a good opportunity for the SLP to curtail the
otherwise inevitable increase in criminality the country was going to experience,
resulting from the large amount of uncontrolled weapons readily available to the
thousands of highly mobilised unemployed former fighters.
The Police Council was established under the Chairmanship of the vice President,
Dr Albert Joe Demby. The Council developed a working document titled ‘Policing
Ethics’ – a 12-paragraph booklet setting the standards for the performance of
police officers to meet by the new millennium. Furthermore, Regional
Commissioners were appointed for the North, South and Eastern Provinces.
In its efforts, the government was supported by a number of development partners
including, significantly, the UK Department for International Development (DFID)
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Other agencies and
International Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), such as ActionAid,
supported the rehabilitation of police infrastructures. Reputable national
management organisations, such as the Institute of Public Administration and
Management (IPAM) and CORD-Sierra Leone, also provided the SLP with useful
information, training and materials for the restructuring process. 
The combination of a return to multi-party democracy, the election of a president
that two years previously had chaired the advisory committee for police reform,
the window of opportunity offered by a (temporary) lull in fighting, and a
governmental priority of restoring law and order and donor funding to help achieve
the same, ensured that police reform obtained priority status within the Kabbah
government. 
15
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 70
3.1 Setback: Part 1
Thus, a number of projects were identified and modalities for their implementation
were underway when the plans were derailed by a coup d’état on 25 May 1997,
by rebel elements of the Sierra Leone army, who promptly invited the RUF into
Freetown to create a joint Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)-RUF
regime. Their first activities included targeting the police, and the prisons,
releasing many prisoners. It was common practice for invading rebels to target
and eliminate established law enforcement groups in order to establish their
primacy. So when the AFRC-RUF alliance entered Freetown, police officers were
a prime target. It proved a very difficult period, with the military junta viewing the
police with suspicion for having been extremely collaborative with the overthrown
government. Senior officers were summoned to the Cockerill Military
Headquarters and warned against feeding information to the now-exiled
government in Guinea. Charley’s account in Box 3.1 demonstrates the difficulties
the police had in working with the junta.
Box 3.1 The idiosyncrasies of the AFRC-RUF junta
I had to temporarily move to Immigration because I was asked to fill in for the Head of
Immigration, who had escaped the coup. Whilst I was there, the AFRC sent their
Attorney General, the late Claude Campbell to discuss with me the possibility of
selling Sierra Leone passports to the Chinese or other interested people because they
wanted to raise revenues in order to buy weapons. And I told them that it was
impossible. It had been possible during the NPRC period because then Hong Kong
was [being ceded back] to China and internationals were all very apprehensive so
everyone was scrambling around to get a foreign passport. Besides, the AFRC regime
had not been recognised internationally, so who was really going to come and buy
passports from them? It wouldn’t have been profitable. 
I advised Campbell as someone that I had a close personal relationship with, and he
related my view to the AFRC. One morning I was at Immigration when Hon. Sergeant
Sankoh aka ‘Zangalo’ and Sergeant Gborie members of the AFRC Council itself,
came to my office and arrested me. They had been advised to bring me down to
Pademba Road prisons. When at Waterloo Street junction [near the prisons], they
stopped the vehicle briefly and Zangalo asked me, ‘Mr Charley, do you know why
we’re taking you to Pademba Road? You, along with other officers, have refused to
accept that we are now in control…’. As soon as I could after I was released I
escaped to Guinea. I left sometime in November 1997.
A colleague of mine, James Kanyako, was also whisked off one morning and accused
of holding meetings at police headquarters and passing information to President
Kabbah in exile. They took him to Cockerill and kept him there the whole day.
Thankfully Kandeh Bangura, the Deputy Inspector General went and pleaded with
them to release him. As soon as Kanyako came back he defected to the ECOMOG
camp [ECOMOG was the West African Peacekeeping Force, who fought the AFRC-
RUF junta to re-install the Kabbah government].
Many senior police officers eventually fled the country, fearing for their safety. But
despite the difficult period some of those with integrity found a way to stay,
realising the need to provide leadership, particularly given that within the military
regime, it was virtually non-existent. The Deputy Inspector General, Kandeh
Bangura deserves particular mention; many police officers feel that if he had left,
4 Common law systems trace their history to England, while civil law systems trace their history to
Roman law and the French Napoleonic code. Common law systems place great weight on court
decisions, which are considered ‘law’ with the same force of law as statutes. Common law courts have
the authority to make law where no legislative statute exists, and statutes mean what courts interpret
them to mean. By contrast, in civil law jurisdictions, courts lack authority to act where there is no
statute, and judicial precedent is given less interpretive weight.
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the integrity of the State would have been completely destroyed. Bangura was the
consummate professional throughout: he ensured that salaries were paid; even
those officers who had fled the military junta found their salaries and other
benefits intact upon their return. He ensured that a structured leadership remained
in place, which also helped when police who had fled returned after ECOMOG
eventually drove the AFRC-RUF alliance out of Freetown in March 1998 and
restored the Kabbah government to power. Although Bangura was from the Limba
ethnic group and therefore close by association to the Limba-dominated junta
leadership, he was not considered to be a junta supporter in any shape or form.
3.2 Reform: take two
With his return to power, the stage was set for the implementation of President
Kabbah’s earlier objectives. Various studies and follow-up activities were
undertaken, culminating in a special request made to the Commonwealth and the
United Nations, which saw the arrival of two International Police teams under the
auspices of the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF) and the
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL).
3.2.1 The Commonwealth cavalry
The teams included a number of experienced police officers, some of whom had
had personal experience policing in post-conflict situations. It was probably an
advantage both that there were two groups of advisors involved, and that the
members of the two groups were from a range of different countries. The head of
the Commonwealth Police Taskforce, Keith Biddle was from the UK, as was his
deputy, Adrian Horn, and Chief Inspector David Tingle, but the other members
came from Zimbabwe, Canada and Sri Lanka. The members of UNOMSIL’s police
teams hailed from Namibia, Kenya, Norway, India and Malaysia.
As Adrian Horn has noted (Albrecht and Jackson 2009: 31), ‘Everyone… had
different experiences of policing and worked with different models’. This meant
that one model could not prevail and there was more commitment to developing a
model that was relevant for and appropriate to the Sierra Leone context. However,
as the officers hailed mostly from Commonwealth countries (former British
colonies), they did have one significant area of policing in common – the tradition
of a common law system, rather than the civil law system,4 which prevails in
France, for instance, and which has produced a different style of policing. Having
a similar tradition, at least in that respect, allowed the different taskforce members
to ‘sing from the same hymn sheet’ as it were.
The government’s commitment to reforming the police was further underlined
when President Kabbah announced the Sierra Leone Police Charter in August
17
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1998 (Appendix 1), which established the primacy of the police as providers of
internal security in Sierra Leone, and reiterated the importance of police reform to
the government. The preamble to this charter states ‘My [SLPP] Government
wants to create a police service which will be a credit to the Nation.’ The charter
spelt out the roles of the police, the government, and citizens. Its overall aim was
‘to see a reborn Sierra Leone Police, which will be a force for good in our Nation’
(Sierra Leone Policing Charter 1998, see Appendix A1).
The Sierra Leone Police produced a mission statement in response to the Charter
(Appendix 2), outlining the Force’s duties, values, priorities and aims. The mission
statement committed the police to respect human rights and the freedom of the
individual; to be honest, impartial and free from corruption; to respond to local
needs and involve all in developing policing priorities; and to endeavour to ‘to win
public confidence by offering reliable, efficient, caring and accountable Police
Services’ (SLP 1998). Unfortunately, these lofty ambitions were summarily halted
by an unforeseen turn of events.
3.3 Setback II
Despite the return of the democratically-elected government to power in 1998 and
the initiation of reforms, peace proved elusive, culminating in an offensive on
Freetown by AFRC-RUF forces on 6 January 1999. Once again they were
repelled by a combination of ECOMOG and Civil Defence Forces (CDF) troops
but the offensive had taken its toll on both the civilian population and the police,
who were targeted once more. The events highlighted the danger of being a
police officer in highly volatile situations for, as obvious symbols of the law, police
stations and barracks were razed to the ground and others severely damaged,
including the Hastings Police Training School, and the Grafton, Jui, Kissy, Ross
Road, and Kingtom Police Barracks.
The Criminal Investigations Department (CID), as one of the main prosecuting
arms of government, was a particular target as many criminals who had joined the
AFRC-RUF junta in 1997 had gone through their system. The Division’s
Headquarters at Pademba Road was burnt down, causing an irrecoverable loss of
documents, records, and case files. Recently acquired equipment under the
funding assistance of UNOMSIL and the CPDTF, including communications and IT
equipment, was either vandalised or looted. Within 48 hours of the invasion the
number of police vehicles was reduced from some 60 to five. An estimated 250
police officers were killed, some along with their families and dependents. About
164 million Leones meant for police salaries was stolen from the Pay and Quarter
Master’s Offices at Police Headquarters; and the police armoury in Kingtom was
broken into, the invaders making away with weaponry and anti-riot gear. 
These incidents are explained in detail to provide an understanding of the depths
from which the police have had to climb. The ‘January 6’ invasion, as it came to
be known, presented a huge setback, rendering the force immobile in its ability to
perform its duties, even after the invasion was repelled and calm restored. If the
prospect of reform had been difficult before, it now presented an even greater
challenge.
5 Kabbah similarly appointed Nigerian ECOMOG Commander Maxwell Kobe as his Chief of Defence
Staff. After Kobe died under mysterious circumstances, a street in the nation’s third city Kenema
(where ECOMOG helped prevent the RUF from taking over) was named after him, and his memory
kept alive through popular song and remembered gratitude.
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3.4 Third time lucky? Reform III
The will of the police, and the reformers, remained unshaken, however. As
Charley wrote in 1999:
The Sierra Leone Police Force accepts being struck, but the force refused to go
down. Our resolve is greater than ever to regain all lost ground and thus build
anew from the rubbles of destruction. Indeed, out of the ashes of our burnt-out
stations, barracks and other installations, we can build up new structures, which
will serve our people into the new millennium. Already, our determined personnel
have started the resuscitation process and are engaged in building make-shift
structures in place of their burnt-out quarters, in time before the start of the rainy
season. This is another indication of the degree of resilience of our personnel…
In their endeavours, they were once again supported by the CPDTF, as well as
police personnel from UNAMSIL, which replaced UNOMSIL as a much larger
peacekeeping force, with an expanded UN mandate in October 1999.
3.4.1 The major player: Keith Biddle
With relative peace restored (although this would not be definitive until 2000) the
Kabbah government returned to its ambitious task of reforming the police. The single-
most important action of immediate significance was Kabbah’s interim appointment
of the Head of the CPDTF, Keith Biddle, a retired Assistant Chief Constable from
Manchester, UK, as Sierra Leone’s interim Inspector General of Police.
As problematic as the appointment may have appeared, it proved a stroke of
genius by the Kabbah administration. By bringing in someone with no political
affiliation or attachments, the government ensured the appointment of someone
who would actually be able to make difficult decisions to bring about change. 
Moreover, it was important for the populace to see that something radical was
being done to make a real break with the past. A BBC news article reporting on
the story in November 1999 commented:
Mr Biddle said he was aware that his appointment as a British Police Officer
could be criticised as a neo-colonial anachronism. But he said he had support
from honest Police Officers and the bulk of ordinary Sierra Leoneans.
Corruption here in all government departments has reached such depths that
many Sierra Leoneans feel they were better off under colonial rule. The war
from which the country is tentatively emerging, has exacerbated the corruption
and mayhem. It is sad but true that most Sierra Leoneans would rather be led
by foreigners than by their own failed political class. 
(Doyle 1999)
While this might be an exaggeration it is true that most Sierra Leoneans felt
profound gratitude towards foreigners,5 and particularly the British, more so after
6 In May 2000, RUF soldiers captured 500 UN peacekeepers, who were part of the provisions of the
1999 Lomé Peace Agreement. The situation that followed threatened to reignite the conflict. British
troops promptly arrived to evacuate their own and other foreign nationals, and an 800-strong contingent
remained to support the UN peacekeepers and support the reconstitution of the Sierra Leone Army.
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the UK’s military intervention in 2000 brought the war to a definitive end.6
Furthermore, the control of the SLP by the British during the colonial period was
still part of many people’s living memory. While it had served as an instrument of
the colonial government and was therefore feared, it had at least been respected
as a highly professional force. Given Sierra Leone’s limited strategic importance to
the UK government, the appointment also had the benefit of not appearing
political or neocolonial.
Furthermore, as the article suggests, reform-minded police were in favour of the
appointment, as the SLP did not have anyone who would have provided credible
leadership at the time – someone able to get enough of the force behind him, and
who could push through painful reform measures with relative impunity. There is
general agreement that if a Sierra Leonean had been appointed to head the force
at the time, very little would have changed. As Sierra Leone is an extremely
relational (neopatrimonial) country, jobs and opportunities often come down to
who you know, and who you are related to. This makes it very difficult to hire and
fire people at will, and can make progress slow. A great advantage of having a
foreigner in place was that he could ignore such machinations (described in more
detail in Box 3.2).
Box 3.2 Neopatrimonialism in Sierra Leonean politics and society
In many African countries, in the absence of formalised institutional contracts and
scarce opportunities, citizens rely on social contracts to progress in life. Often, these
social contracts are described as neopatrimonialism.
The concept of neopatrimonialism is derived from Weber’s definition of patrimonialism,
whereby authority is ascribed to a person rather than an office-holder, who is firmly
anchored in a social and political order, in a system held together by loyalty or kinship
ties rather than hierarchical administrative grades and functions (Clapham 1985).
As defined by Clapham (1985: 48), neopatrimonialism is a ‘form of organisation in which
relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system
which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines.’ As such, neopatrimonialism is
concerned with the informalisation of state and political power and the distribution of
scarce resources through patronage networks. It combines, to various degrees, ‘lack of
separation between public and private spheres… privatised extraction and redistribution
along regional, ethnic and family lines. Power is personal, business is politics, the state
is both simultaneously strong and weak’ (Bøås 2003: 32). Professional progress
depends on connections, rather than qualifications and expertise. 
Bøås (2001) argues that an extreme version of neopatrimonialism existed in Sierra
Leone prior to the war. A feature of the post-conflict period has been efforts to reverse
the neopatrimonial state, including introducing more citizen-centred governance, such
as local government elections, decentralised ministries and services, such as the
police and more radical measures, such as appointing a foreigner, Keith Biddle, as the
Head of the Sierra Leone Police.
7 Charley, interview, 20 January 2011.
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Biddle pursued two tactics – one included identifying reform-minded police officers
he knew he would be able to work with. In doing so he made it a policy to ignore
seniority – a core aspect of a hierarchical organisation like the police – in favour of
his own perception of competence. To this end, he identified a number of relatively
young people, and within a very short space of time he brought them up in the
hierarchy and sent them to the UK for training, to create a reservoir of people who
shared his vision and who he therefore knew he would be able to work with. He
showed a glaring preference for educated people over less educated – but
perhaps more experienced – officers. He promoted quickly those officers who he
perceived as being particularly smart.
The other tactic was to neutralise or get rid of spoilers outright. He found ways to
retire people he felt he could not work with, by invoking a clause within the civil
service wherein the Head of Department could retire staff from his institution
before they reach the age of retirement, as long as valid reasons are given. Other
tactics he used to get rid of senior colleagues he could not work with was to lure
them out of the organisation with secondments, including Kandeh Bangura, the
Deputy IG who had bravely safeguarded police interests during the AFRC regime:
although reform-minded, and highly regarded by SLP officers, he still belonged to
the old school and fearing being retired by Biddle became more concerned with
personal survival than spearheading reforms. James Kanyako was seconded to
the newly constituted Anti-Corruption Commission. Some middle-ranking officials
who were perceived to be allies of Bangura were also investigated over the
misuse of police property and for corrupt practices.
Predictably, not all Biddle’s tactics were particularly welcomed, even by the
reformers – some of whom were critical of certain approaches. His style was
sometimes reminiscent of the ‘divide and rule’ approach of the colonial regime in
the 1800s. There were also some competent, reform-minded police that were not
Biddle’s ‘blue-eyed boys and girls’7 who were left out – particularly as he focused
on people who he perceived he could work with rather than those who offered
critiques to his management style. Eventually, however, he came to appreciate
this group and their abilities, and promoted them accordingly.
In any case, Biddle left in 2003, and was replaced, on his recommendation, by
Brima Acha Kamara. Kabbah’s approval of the recommendation spoke volumes
about the extent to which political preferences held sway, as Kamara was seen as
aligned to the main opposition party of the time, the All People’s Congress (APC).
It indicated that Biddle had left a legacy that gave preference to competence
rather than seniority or political affiliation. Before he left he also tried to regularise
a lot of systems and ensure that the group he had promoted was in place to
continue the work. Kamara maintained and continued many of Biddle’s reforms,
successfully steering the country through the 2007 elections, which saw a
peaceful change of government, from the SLPP to the APC. The election of
Biddle’s protégés to the highest office of the SLP continued with the appointment
of Francis Munu, who had served as Biddle’s Operations Officer, to the position of
IG in 2010.
8 Interview, 10 January 2011.
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4 The Sierra Leonean reformers
This sets the tone for a discussion of the profile of Sierra Leonean officers
involved in the reform. A large number were sourced from the Cadet Officer
Programme described above, along with university graduates that had been
recruited subsequently. Many had been frustrated in the early years of their
service to the police, but had held on, doing their best within a system that was
largely derided by the public it was meant to protect. 
The reform process presented an opportunity for this group to realise the vision of
the police they had joined years before. Indeed, during the reform period, the
Cadet Officer squad made and continue to make up the majority of the senior
ranks of the Sierra Leone Police, and have thus been heavily involved in the
reform process. The current IG is also a graduate of the programme.
Among these senior officers are the first enrolled in the programme, including
Chris Charley, who attended Njala University College and graduated with a BA in
Education in 1980. After this he taught at the Government Rokel School in
Freetown, and part-time at other schools. He was also an examiner with the
Examinations Council and seemed set to make his career in the academic world.
This career progression was halted when he enrolled in the Cadet Officer
Programme in 1984.
Kadi Fakondo also joined the programme in 1984. She had studied in the USA
previously and after seeing the differences in policing between the US and Sierra
Leone, returned to join the force in the hope that she would be able to implement
what she had seen.
The current Inspector General of Police, Francis Munu, who holds a Masters
degree in Business Administration, is also a cohort of this group. A popular Sierra
Leone Diaspora newspaper commented on his appointment in 2010 thus: 
The appointment of Mr. Francis Munu as Inspector General of Police in Sierra
Leone signals a positive new direction for the country. His appointment
signals a new era in Sierra Leone where excellence, professionalism and
commitment matters more than party or tribal affiliations… IG Munu has
distinguished himself as a man of integrity who put his country above
personal gains, and that has paid off in his appointment as Inspector General
of Police.
(Conteh 2010)
Some of these officers had taken to limiting their obvious association with the
police because of their communities’ negative perception. Officers who had found
themselves limited within a poorly led and badly managed police force finally
found a government, support and the resources to enable them to realise their
dream. As Kadi Fakondo put it, ‘It took so many years but it finally paid off
because my aspiration was to get to the top and be part of a policing body to
bring changes and reform to the Sierra Leone Police.’8
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 70
22
However, not all senior officers were on board. Kadi Fakondo continues:
when the restructuring of the SLP came [it was as if] we (all SLP officers) were
all standing on the platform… There were those of us who were ready to jump
on board this [restructuring] train. There were those standing in the middle
very confused – should I get on the train or not, what benefit am I going to get
from this? And then there was a third group – I do not want change. I’m not
going to get on board this train. So we had this task of actually working hard to
convince others to come on board (ibid.).
5 Restructuring and reforms
The reforms officers had to take on board were wide ranging and ambitious.
Internally, efforts had to be made to curb corruption and encourage the police to
take pride in their vocation. Externally, there was a real need to strengthen civilian
oversight of the police, as well as to improve relations between the public and the
police. Furthermore, the war had brought untold destruction to police
infrastructure, with logistical support either damaged or looted. 
5.1 Internal control mechanisms 
The Research and Planning Department (R&P) of the SLP led the way with the
internal restructuring process. In 1998 it sent out questionnaires within the
organisation which asked serving personnel straightforward questions about their
views on what they wanted the police force to look like, the limiting factors
preventing them from doing their jobs properly, and so on. Open meetings were
also held, inviting officers to contribute to the discussion. Response to these
invitations to contribute was initially lukewarm, however. As a result, suggestion
boxes were put up at the various police stations, which proved very successful:
while personnel were timid in the face of efforts to engage them in face-to-face
dialogue, fearing a backlash from their peers, when they were able to make
‘faceless’ contributions they were happy to express their opinions.
The information gathered from the questionnaires and suggestion boxes was
analysed by R&P, in collaboration with the Executive Board (see below). They
informed the SLP strategic plan’s priority areas, with projects accordingly
introduced to achieve the objectives. Since 1999, the strategic planning cycle has
been a major area of progress in the way the SLP works, and contributes towards
the SLP’s organisational development process, aiming to strengthen the
management of, and get the best use out of, the organisation’s ‘scarce human,
material and financial resources’ (SLP 2008). It was a highly participatory exercise,
comprising performance reviews, research on the operating environment, and
extensive consultation with stakeholders, including members of the general public. 
Abridged versions of strategic planning documents are now produced as
standard, for dissemination to the media, NGOs, and other stakeholders, so they
are aware of what the police are supposed to be doing and can hold them to
account. They are also disseminated to the various divisions all over the country,
which are asked to regularly monitor their progress towards achieving the plan. 
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Another significant internal reform was the establishment of the Executive
Management Board (EMB), comprising the IG, the Deputy Inspector General and
all the AIGs (there are AIGs for each main department of the SLP: Professional
Standards; Operations; Crime Services; Support Services; and Personnel Training
and Welfare, as well as for each of the four regions – North, South, East and
West). Before the restructuring, management of the police was a one-man show,
headed by the Inspector General of Police. Under the new system, the EMB
convenes weekly to discuss strategic decisions on management and personnel. 
There is a clear chain for disseminating decisions made at Executive Board level,
which its members, the AIGs, are tasked to roll out. In the regions they are
responsible for, AIGs meet with their Local Unit Commanders (LUCs) to discuss
what has been decided on. The EMB model is replicated at divisional level, with
each LUC heading a Tasking Coordination Group (TCG), which they are expected
to convene regularly to review and plan policing within their divisions. In addition to
the LUC, the TCG comprises the Crime Officer, Support Officer, Operations Officer
and Information Officer, as well as a Local Policing Partnership Board (LPPB – see
below) member. TCGs also have the responsibility of sharing information with the
rank and file. This chain is supplemented by Force Orders (internal memoranda),
and a lot of information is disseminated by being read at morning parades and so
forth, ensuring that information and decisions flow from top to bottom. 
Other significant changes pertain to recruitment, retention, promotion and
remuneration policies. Prior to the restructuring, corruption was rife in the
recruitment of police officers, with the result that many uneducated, unqualified
people joined the force. New standards for basic recruits include: being a Sierra
Leone citizen; education at least until fourth grade; ability to pass a written exam
in English, Maths and General Studies; no criminal record; mental and physical
fitness (which involves passing a medical that includes an HIV test); and being
between the ages of 18 and 25.
In terms of remuneration and retention, huge efforts were made to ensure that
police officers were paid a living wage. Attention was also paid to other non-
remunerative factors, such as ensuring officers were supplied with new uniforms
and boots, replacing faded uniforms that undermined professionalism and were
the source of much derision by the general public.
A related reform, but one that proved extremely unpopular, was the decision to
change the ranking structure, reducing the number of ranks from 19 to nine. The
previous bloated structure had been very inefficient, making oversight and
decision-making difficult, distorting roles, and hiding and allowing the promotion of
incompetent officers. It was also unwieldy, limiting effective information flows and
chains of command. 
The move came under a lot of criticism, particularly as people in ranks that were
phased out were more often demoted to a lower rank than promoted. It particularly
caused frustration among older officers; the decision was so unpopular and
upsetting that it was actually linked to a number of untimely deaths. Efforts were
made, however, to ensure those who lost out still remained committed to the reform.
For instance, the frustrations of the officers whose ranks were phased out were
managed by ensuring that their salaries did not change when they were demoted. 
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Other internal control measures undertaken involve the creation of specialised
departments, including (Charley 2008):
? The Complaint, Discipline and Internal Investigation Department, which
deals with complaints from members of the public against SLP personnel.
? The Internal Audit Department acts as an internal oversight body to ensure
quality assurance, probity and judicious use of resources. This department
carries out regular audits to ensure the organisation adheres to all financial
and monetary regulations mandated by government, as well as to identify
lapses and impropriety.
? The Corporate Service Department, which is the think tank of the Change
Management Process. It provides technical advice, guidance and timely
information to help management to formulate policies to allocate, manage,
monitor and control the use of SLP’s limited resources.
? The Equal Opportunity Department, which was set up to ensure that every
member of the SLP enjoys equal opportunity irrespective of age, sex, religion,
tribe, etc. Top management now puts a lot of premium on, for instance,
stamping out the issue of sexual harassment within the SLP, and attracting
qualified females to the force.
5.2 External oversight 
For the SLP to be successful it was critical to engage with the public, and try to
overcome the public’s perception that the police was an intrinsically and irreversibly
corrupt institution. To this end, extensive consultations were held with members of
the public at the start of the reform process, in the form of town and village
meetings, public perception surveys and civil society consultations. Traditional,
economic and cultural groups (such as market women’s, cassette sellers’, hawkers’
and taxi drivers’ associations) were all consulted and engaged in the process. They
were able to air their grievances, and comment on what they felt were important
aspects of restructuring, how they expected the police to engage with them and,
importantly, engage in a process that was transparent and that set the ball rolling
for them to have confidence in, and even work with, the police. 
A variety of systems and procedures were also put in place to maintain good
relations between the Police and the public. A very proactive Community
Relations Department works with communities. An example of its work is
outreach at schools, where it collaborates with student-led committees such as
anti-violence groups, which are active in collaborating with the police to help
reduce street violence.
Community members are regularly engaged to identify any problems they have
with the police, and the force regularly investigates how best the police can
improve its service delivery. Findings are reported to management and discussed
during EMB meetings. A Human Rights Unit and Media and Public Relations
Department ensure that the public is both provided with timely information about
police activities and supported to provide inputs to the Police Strategy and
activities; and a Complaints Division ensures that anyone with a grievance
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against the police can report it. Members of the public also have recourse to the
Ombudsman in the event that [a] person views an act of the personnel to be
unjust, unfair or intimidating (Charley 2008).
While this has informed policing from the bottom-up, top-down oversight of the
police was also reformed, with the re-institution of a Police Council headed by the
country’s Vice President. Its functions include advising the president on all major
matters of policy relating to internal security, and (with the president’s approval)
make regulations for the performance of the SLP.
Additionally, the Parliamentary Oversight Committee oversees the activities of
the SLP and has the power to question its operations. Parliament also has the
powers to summon SLP management to give justifications for certain actions or
demands (Charley 2008: 115). Human rights and other civil society groups/NGOs
also play a key role in providing oversight and providing checks and balances to
the Police (ibid.). 
5.3 Developing external relations: engaging the community
Very early on it was recognised that the police would not be able to maintain law
and order by themselves, and would require the assistance of the wider
community. However, there was a conscious effort made to ensure that Sierra
Leone’s experience of Community Policing – an approach strongly influencing the
Commonwealth Task Force, and particularly espoused by its British members –
was not subject to preconceived notions of Community Policing (Albrecht and
Jackson 2009). 
Box 5.1 The philosophy behind Community Policing
Community Policing (CP) is considered a key principle of ‘doing’ policing in the UK,
stemming from a perceived need to improve police-public relations in the face of
various social crises (such as the race riots that occurred in a number of English cities
in the early 1980s). Accordingly, in countries where the UK has brought its policing
expertise to bear, such as in Sierra Leone, CP has invariably been promoted as part
of the restructuring process.
The main elements of Community Policing include: policing directed by community
engagement, where communities have a voice in police priorities and practices;
devolution of responsibilities to officers on the ground, allowing them to make
decisions with the community; partnership with other agencies and local authorities in
securing the public’s interest and resolving problems; a proactive (rather than
reactive) approach to problem solving; and an orientation towards maintaining peace
rather than enforcing the law (Mackenzie and Henry 2009). 
CP is meant to result in better outcomes in the following areas: increased public
satisfaction with the police; decreased fear of crime; reductions in levels of crime and
anti-social behaviour; community involvement in solving local problems associated
with crime; and improved levels of job satisfaction among community officers.
Sierra Leone’s experience was not only different from what the task force
members had experienced before, it was also clear that different parts of the
country were going to require different types of community engagement. In some
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areas, where state presence was limited, the SLP had never been present, and
people were only familiar with traditional forms of authority; some areas of the
country had been under RUF control for years, while in other communities CDF
fighters had taken over the provision of security, and the imposition of law and
order. Therefore, a system was needed that was flexible enough to engage with
these different needs in different communities. Boxes 5.2 and 5.3 elaborate on
two of Chris Charley’s experiences, which vividly illustrate the complexity of
attempting to consolidate police presence in the Southern Province, a region
where (1) Civil Defence Forces (in this region known as Kamajors) had taken over
responsibility for maintaining law and order in some areas and (2) traditional
authority held sway in others.
Box 5.2 Regaining control from Civil Defence Forces in Bo
During the war, in the face of the double threat from both the RUF and rogue
elements of the Sierra Leone Army, many communities mobilised their own civil
militias (mostly derived from traditional hunting societies). Although now collectively
known as Kamajors, the actual term is a specific reference to the militias that formed
in the south and the east of the country, mostly in Bo District. They successfully
repelled the RUF from Bo, Sierra Leone’s second city, and subsequently set
themselves up as police, judge and jury, arresting, imprisoning and even executing
suspected criminals. Although initially formed with the very good intention of protecting
their people and territories, they soon became known for administering justice in their
own, often brutal, style. They became a law unto themselves, accountable to none,
making the task of reintroducing an operational police presence into the area almost
impossible. In March 2001, Charley was made regional commissioner of Bo District,
and provides an account of his efforts to re-establish police primacy.
The Kamajors were initially highly suspicious of the police. Before the war the police
were highly corrupt and directly following the war they had all but disappeared.
Conversely the Kamajors were formed of the people and had fought to re-establish
freedom and security in various regions. They were widely respected and believed
themselves to have a legitimate claim to managing security, having earned the right
through their bravery and sacrifice during the war. They also had the strength and
numbers to remain even if challenged. This is the situation into which I arrived in Bo,
with the mandate to first gain the cooperation of the Kamajors and then to take control
of the distribution of law and order.
At meetings with stakeholders and key decision-makers, I witnessed first-hand how
much the locals trusted the Kamajors, which contrasted heavily with my experience of
our police station, which was generally avoided. I was able to ascertain that the issue
was mostly down to trust: the Kamajors were trusted, the police were not. Years of
police corruption had left our reputation in tatters and bolstered that of the Kamajors.
This did not change the fact that the Kamajors were not the legitimate body to
administer justice but it did show that we needed to work with them.
The job required a lot of skill and diplomacy. They had their own systems – some that
worked well, others not so well, but either way, we had to deal with them tactfully,
otherwise we would have lost our legitimacy. Their law was loosely based on tradition,
they had been there when we were nowhere in sight, and they had leaders who were
respected nationally, competent and effective in their own right. One such leader was
the late Hinga Norman; recognised as the head of the Kamajors (he was even served
as Minister of Defence during the war, although he was subsequently indicted by the
9 Interview on 6 January 2011.
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Special Court of Sierra Leone). I soon realised how important it was to strike a very
good rapport with him. This was easier than I initially thought due to the fact that he
was a man who liked his whiskey. Whenever he was in Bo I would make sure he
received a bottle of whiskey; this simple gesture encouraged him to visit my residence
whenever he journeyed from Freetown back to Bo – establishing a rapport which
gradually won over his followers.
Another strategy I adopted was to drop my customary security detail when visiting the
Kamajors; despite my seniority, I drove myself around and visited them alone in their
secretariat, and to any meetings with them – they were impressed that an official of
such a high ranking as myself dared to visit them in their compound without any
security of my own – to my mind it was less an act of daring as of trust, one which
gradually opened lines of communication. Slowly they started reporting their crimes to
us and allowing us to bring people held in their custody to the police station. There
were even people on their ‘death-row’ who are alive today because I was able to
negotiate their release from Kamajor custody and unite them with their families when
their time had been served.
By inviting their representatives to shadow our investigation branch they were able to
see the extent to which the SLP had been reformed in terms of accountability and
professionalism. Working in cooperation with the Kamajors had the benefit of not only
inducting them into police procedure but also of empowering them to register and
process members of their group who had committed crimes. This alliance developed
further into an arrangement whereby the Kamajors were allowed to access their
members after formal processing and administer civil justice in cases we deemed to
be less serious, for example domestic rather than criminal cases. 
We also had a system whereby we allowed them to detain Kamajor prisoners, but
only after we had correctly processed them. Prior to this, they were arresting and
detaining lawbreakers, confiscating articles from the scene of the crime and sharing
them among themselves. This was problematic for us, as it meant the loss of precious
evidence that was often key to a case. There was also the issue of the Kamajors’
brutal treatment of people while in their custody. So we worked with them to reduce
these incidences.
Understandably, many of my own officers criticised this arrangement, feeling that I
was ceding too much control, but in reality I was led by simple pragmatism: the
Kamajors were still armed and they could have posed a lot of problems for us. But
gradually everyone from both sides agreed that it was working; on our part, the police
were transparent in their dealings, accountable to the public and the Kamajors worked
within the parameters of their cooperative role until we were finally able to take
complete control of administering law and order in Bo.9
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Box 5.3 Treading carefully around traditional authority
The Bondo Society in Sierra Leone is widely revered, if not feared, and therefore
rarely interfered with. A girl is initiated into the Bondo society through seclusion in the
Bondo ‘Bush’, by way of a female circumcision and what are considered other rites of
passage into womanhood. It is a common practice throughout Sierra Leone. It is also
a highly political issue, demonstrated by the fact that despite international campaigns
and pressure from rights activists in the capital to put an end to the practice, the
strength of Bondo is such that politicians have been reluctant to oppose, and in fact
have continued to endorse the practice, for fear of the losing support of its powerful
champions (Afrol 2002). In rural areas female circumcision in not open to public
discussion. In his policing duties in Bo, Charley had to find a way to deal
diplomatically with this very powerful traditional group.
Undoing the distrust sown by years of injustice and corruption within the police force
is a constant endeavour. It requires an in-depth understanding of the local situations in
which we work, a sensitivity to the importance of good community relations, and
cordial ties with traditional authorities.
One experience that highlights the importance of policing in tandem with traditional
authority occurred while I was serving in Bo, involving a particularly sensitive case
concerning a girl aged about seven. Her mother came to the police distraught, to
report that her daughter had been abducted and initiated into the Bondo society.
Although formal arms of the law rarely get involved in traditional practices, in this
case, the mother was reporting an abduction, which the police could not ignore.
However, as serious an offence as kidnapping was, and the forced initiation of the girl
represented human rights abuse, it was still a particularly sensitive issue because it
involved complex traditional law. 
A swift response was therefore essential, one that would likely require the mounting of
police rescue, especially with the potential medical implications of the situation. But in
this case it was essential to ‘think outside the box’ due to the power of the Bondo
Society – as much guardians of culture as of community – in Sierra Leone traditions.
My knowledge of local customs dictated that the obvious course of action would be to
approach the Paramount Chief of the area. As the title suggests, the Paramount Chief
is a very important figure in Sierra Leone society. He is the ultimate judge in all family
disputes, and final authority in all traditional, ceremonial and domestic matters. The
SLP relies upon congenial relationships with local Chiefs to effectively serve the
communities they represent, and we are obliged to work alongside them. In areas of
limited police presence, the paramount authority and their chiefdom police are
responsible for maintaining law and order. Even where police are present, there is
often delineated authority, with the Chiefdom authority generally responsible for
familial law, and the SLP being responsible for ‘serious’ crimes, such as larceny,
assault and murder.
Through the course of the case I came to deeply respect traditional structures, and
the way things work within the traditional system. After listening to a report of the
situation, the Chief explained that no initiation could take place without the knowledge
of the Chief Sowie (the chief female initiator, a very powerful figure in traditional
society), and he summoned her immediately to his compound. She denied all
knowledge of the initiation.
Bondo is a lucrative business; much is spent on the associated celebrations and
Sowies are paid handsomely for their services. However, within traditional law Bondo
should also only be undertaken within a strict ceremonial context where not only
10 Interview on 6 January 2011.
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familial consent is given but also appropriate expertise used. In this, the Chief Sowie
is key. It was thus deduced that this particular ‘Bondo Bush’ had been convened
outside of the traditional convention, by a woman who had ascribed to herself the title
and power of a Sowie. However, whether sanctioned or not, the self-elected Sowie
was still a Bondo member, and therefore well respected in the community. Moreover
the Bondo Bush, as it is demarcated, is taboo to men, so male police officers could
hardly storm in to rescue the girls she was initiating. 
I therefore decided that the best way to justify a police intrusion would be on medical
grounds, due to the girls having been initiated outside the traditional context with
appropriate oversight – making the girls prone to infection, especially given the humid
and damp conditions of the rainy season. So to these ends I approached the Chief
Medical Officer at the Bo Hospital in search of a female nurse who could not only
handle any potential medical problems but who was also a member of the Bondo
society. As luck would have it, the Chief Ward Sister fit these requirements and
agreed to accompany the police team. Female police officers under command were
gathered and the situation explained. Anyone who was not a society member was
excused from the mission. I led the team and although they had already been
initiated, we were successful in rescuing the girls from the grossly unhygienic
conditions in which they were being kept, worsened by the heavy rains, putting the
lives of the girls at serious risk. We were able to provide them with medical attention
in time to prevent any major infection or loss of life.
This is one example of the fine balance that needs to be struck between our
responsibility to serve the public, highly sensitive political and cultural interests, and
the traditional authority. In the past we bowed to the authority and political interests
over the individual but today this is no longer the case. This case also highlights the
necessity of working with other institutions, such as the medical profession, in our
effort to safeguard the security of our citizens.10
Given the need, as highlighted in the two accounts in Boxes 5.2 and 5.3, to engage
with various members of the community to ensure the effective operation of the
police, it was clear that a system of policing, with community engagement at the
centre, was necessary. Local Needs Policing (LNP) was developed as a way of
capturing the locale-specific nature of policing that would be required, but one that
could be delivered in different places within a ‘national framework of standards
and guidelines’ with a basic organisational structure that was effectively and
efficiently managed, accountable and with devolved authority and designed to deliver
the policing needs within the local community (Albrecht and Jackson 2009: 32).
6 Local Needs Policing
The main structure for driving LNP is the Local Policing Partnership Board – the
LPPB. The LPPB is essentially a partnership between the SLP and the community
in each of Sierra Leone’s 32 police divisions. It is coordinated by the Local Unit
Commander, who administers SLP policies locally but the board is populated by
upstanding members of the community from different walks of life, including
paramount chiefs, religious leaders, women’s group leaders and so on (a member of
11 Interview, 10 January 2011, supplemented by information from Fakondo’s Master’s dissertation.
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the police is normally involved in the capacity of secretary, to ensure that meetings
are well documented; some capacity training is also provided). The LPPB comprises
a chair (who also sits on the TCG) and members that coordinate joint patrols, and
get involved in neighbourhood watch, intelligence gathering, and so on. 
LPPBs are meant to be representative of a cross-section of the community.
Existing members vote in new members, through elections coordinated by the
community relations department, which also regularly sensitises the community
about the purpose of the LPPB, and publicises elections. While LPPBs vary from
division to division, some are extremely vibrant and proactive, and have been
extremely helpful in supporting the police in their work. Their activities are varied:
they help decide which issues the police should prioritise; they highlight areas of
high crime and where more resources need to be applied; members inspect police
cells; they support their local police units by lobbying their MPs on their behalf;
engagement is constant. It has been a very good symbiotic relationship and, the
police believe, is one of the reasons that the public’s confidence in them has
grown. 
While police officers are present in an estimated 80 per cent of the country, the
reality is that in many areas police presence is not felt, particularly in areas that
are not easily accessible – so while police may be present within the division or
locality, few are deployed in remote areas. These are areas in which the LPPB
comes into its own. They are present in even the most remote areas and stand in
for the police (although all perpetrators, for instance, are handed over to the police
as soon as possible). 
While the LPPB is at division-level, divisions are further sub-divided into smaller
communities. These coordinate Community Safety Volunteers (CSVs) – able-bodied
men and women in good standing with the community (recommended by the
community and further vetted by the police). CSVs help the police by patrolling their
neighbourhoods, night and day. They are easily identified by vests provided by the
police, and are empowered to conduct citizens’ arrests. It is important to note that
they are not vigilantes. In fact, one indication that there is increased trust in and
collaboration between communities and the police are the increased numbers of
arrested people that are being brought to the police after citizen arrests, rather than
the community dealing with it themselves (e.g. through mob justice). 
6.1 The establishment of specialised units 
As indicated above, a range of new departments were introduced to ensure that
reforms were taken forward and sustained. However other departments were
created after the fact – arising from particular needs the police were faced with,
given the particular nature of the post-conflict environment. One such department
was the Family Support Unit (FSU), established in 2001 to respond to cases
relating to sexual and Gender Based Violence. The Family Support Unit made it
easier for women and girls to report domestic violence and seek appropriate
assistance (Fakondo 2009: 11). In Box 6.1, AIG Kadi Fakondo, who was largely
responsible for its development, explains the origins of the FSU.11
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Box 6.1 The creation of the Family Support Unit (by AIG Kadi Fakondo)
The FSU grew out of the Domestic Violence Unit (DVU) which I started at Kissi [in the
east end of Freetown]. After I came back from Beijing [the Fourth World Congress on
Women in 1995] I had the idea of setting up the DVU [but did not have the opportunity
prior to the restructuring]. While I was stationed at Kissi Police Station just after the
conflict ended, women came in regularly to report their problems but we didn’t know
how to address it, so I started the DVU. At first it was on a very small scale but once
they heard about it more and more people were coming to report – bush wives [girls
and women who had been abducted and held during the conflict] and a lot of rape
cases. Women were being told: there’s nothing wrong with you going to the police and
reporting that your husband has beaten you up and many came. We realised we were
building the confidence of the people and more and more came to report their cases.
I remember Keith Biddle and members of the Commonwealth Team visiting my
station. They thought it was such a brilliant idea they decided to bring in a consultant
to help scale it up. So I worked with a consultant, Bill Roberts. Together we put
together the idea of the FSU, starting with a pilot scheme in Freetown. When we went
to the regions, it caught like wildfire. This was done through sensitisation campaigns
and awareness-raising activities on Gender Based Violence in communities around
the country. Soon, every district, every area wanted an FSU. 
We worked closely with a team of officers attached to the Criminal Investigations
Department. But we realised that the demands on the FSU were so great that we had
to get some support for specialised training and support. So the Commonwealth Team
came in and trained the police officers. Upon review, we recognised the need to train
social workers alongside the police. So the police began to specifically look at
investigating crimes, while social workers worked on protection. In this aspect we
worked very closely with the Ministry of Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs
(MSWGCA). It was really gaining momentum and we now realised they need to have
information going out so we went on radio, talked about it, informed the people.
DFID provided funding for the programme. Trainers came from the Commonwealth
Team, who after initial training realised the need to have training of trainers who would be
responsible for rolling out the training programme. We also had to put some money
towards the evaluation of what was happening, so we had one of the senior investigators
go to all the areas where we had FSU and we did an assessment and annual report. 
We also worked very closely with UNICEF and other NGOs, such as the International
Rescue Committee, one of our key partners (and once you have organisations like the
INGOs working closely with you, you get the confidence of the people). We had
worked with UNICEF before but this intensified after we established the FSU. Before
all this nobody had wanted to do any work with the police. We were not getting any
support, especially from the INGOs, because they believed that the police was
corrupt, derelict and untrained. But then the FSU was set up and we started
prosecuting cases to court. These were widely publicised, on the radio, everyone was
talking about it, especially women’s organisations who really supported us. We even
had the Commonwealth support to bring in a specialised judge to try FSU cases.
Between 2004 and 2005 the efforts of FSUs and their partners resulted in 21
convictions of perpetrators of domestic violence, with prison terms ranging from six
months to 22 years. That sent a signal to the entire populace that nobody would be
spared as long as there was sufficient evidence against him. This led to the increase in
the number of cases reported. Every FSU in the 26 Police Divisions countrywide is
tasked to investigate and charge to court all reported cases of physical and sexual
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violence against women and children including child cruelty. By 2005 the Family
Support Unit staff members including other police officers and Social Workers had
been trained in awareness-raising, human rights, media and communication skills,
record-keeping and files/job tracking systems, and the joint investigation of sexual
abuse (by police and Social Workers). The training was sponsored by the SLP,
UNAMSIL Civilian Police, [and the] Department for International Development (DFID),
support was also provided by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), International Rescue Committee
(IRC), the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs and other agencies.
Initiatives such as the FSU were extremely relevant for Sierra Leone’s post-war
context, arising from a situation where sexual violence had been a prominent
feature of the country’s ten-year conflict. They were also a radical departure from
the past, where ‘family matters’ were considered the strict purview of traditional
and cultural authorities, whose abuse of their decision-making power over
sentencing in social cases had been at least one contributing factor to the war
(Richards 2005).
Furthermore, the involvement of the CPDTF and the initiatives that were being
introduced gave other international aid organisations the confidence to work with
the police. This provided them with further legitimacy among the populace, for
whom these agencies represented the source of the majority of services they had
access to, particularly in the early post-war period.
6.2 Resourcing
The changes made to the police have been sweeping. Other studies (Meek 2003;
Baker 2006; Gbla et al. 2009; Albrecht and Jackson 2009; Albrecht 2010) have
detailed the extent and content of spending on reforming the SLP, so suffice it
here to say simply that none of the progress would have been possible or even
imaginable without the sustained provision of funds by international donors –
ranging from technical advice, staff training (including courses abroad), the
provision of vehicles and other logistics, recruitment, the construction and
rehabilitation of police structures and so on. Most of this has been from DFID (see
Box 6.2), channelled through the CPDTF but support has also been received from
the UN, regionally from Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
and the Nigerian Government in particular, and a whole host of other international
donors funding different aspects. 
Box 6.2 DFID’s Security and Justice Sector Reform Policy in Sierra
Leone 
Security and Justice Sector Reform (SJSR) is an approach that has been championed
by the UK Government in fragile and post-conflict countries (Ball et al. 2007). In Sierra
Leone, it formed part of a joint approach incorporating security sector reform (through
the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP)), access to justice
(through the Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP)), and the reform of the
military (through the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT)). 
SJSR has been led by the UK Department for International Development, and the
Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), which aims to draw together the work of the
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and DFID
(DFID 2004). The logic is that despite their different mandates and policy objectives,
the three institutions share sufficient interest in poverty reduction and conflict
prevention to provide a coherent platform for SJSR. 
Rule of law, accountability, transparency, accessibility and affordability are central to
the SJSR agenda. The four key elements of the agenda are (Ball et al. 2007):
? develop and implement an institutional framework
? establish and implement the principle of democratic control of the security sector
through the practice of good governance, especially oversight, accountability, and
transparency
? develop capable, professional and accountable security services and justice
systems
? foster a culture that is supportive of the above among the political, security and
justice leadership.
The aim of SILSEP (1999–2008) was ‘to assist in the creation of an enabling
environment within the security sector to ensure the successful and sustainable
implementation of the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Implementation Plan
(SSRIP), as articulated within Pillar 1 of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)
and the new National Security Policy (NSP)’ (Biesheuvel et al. 2007). Through
SILSEP, DFID and ACPP provided support to the Office of National Security (ONS),
Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU), Ministry of Defence (MOD), Sierra
Leone Police (SLP), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) and a range of non-security
related institutions with an interest in accountability and enhanced service delivery
across the security sector (parliament, civil society, media and academia) (Biesheuvel
et al. 2007).
The goal of the JSDP, initiated in 2004 for a five year period, was the improved safety,
security and access to justice for the people of Sierra Leone. Its purpose was to
support the development of an effective and accountable Justice Sector capable of
meeting the needs and interests of the people of Sierra Leone, particularly the poor,
the vulnerable and the marginalised’ (JSDP 2004).
IMATT (SL) was established in 2002 following the end of war and disarmament of
rebels by the UN in Sierra Leone. Its mission is to help develop the Sierra Leone
Armed Forces into a democratically accountable, effective and sustainable force, able
to fulfil security tasks required by the Government of Sierra Leone (MoD).
While the three reform components lacked coherence in their initial design, they
became increasingly connected over time, and the Sierra Leone SJSR Programme
serves as a successful example of cross-agency cooperation. Much of the SJSR work
was pioneered and tested in Sierra Leone: of the £90.6 million spent by the ACPP on
SJSR, 96 per cent of it was spent on Sierra Leone; additionally, 61 per cent of DFID’s
bilateral allocation for Sierra Leone was spent on SJSR (ibid.).
The SLP has been extremely fortunate to have received such sustained support
from international partners in its endeavours. While this reduced somewhat after
Biddle left in 2003, significant funding continued to be sourced under the Justice
Sector Development Programme. Started in 2005, in addition to the police, the
five-year programme also provided support to the judiciary, magistracy, prisons
and relevant government ministries and departments (DFID 2004). Additionally,
particular support was provided for policing the 2007 elections and it is expected
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this will again be forthcoming in 2012. But the reality is that Sierra Leone is no
longer considered a post-conflict country. In the face of dwindling international
support and interest, how sustainable will the reforms be? In a country beset with
allegations of corruption at all levels of government, how immune are the SLP? In
a context in which the public is increasingly dissatisfied with their levels of public
service, how engaged with local needs policing will they continue to be?
7 Challenges and the road ahead
A number of the challenges facing the police were well documented by Al Shek
Kamara, a former Chief Superintendent of Police, in his essay that formed part of
his application for promotion to the rank of AIG in 2005, titled ‘Future Challenges
facing the Sierra Leone Police Force’. Many of the issues are still of relevance,
and are summarised here.
Referring to the community policing strategy, Kamara noted that it ‘is yet to gain
full acceptance by a good number of… police personnel who are merely paying lip
service to it’ (Kamara 2005: 15). As with many reforms it is not easy to change
things overnight, and ‘attempting to switch from a highly centralised, authoritarian
structure to a decentralised, democratic approach in a relatively short period of
time is… a difficult undertaking’ (ibid.).
Indeed, the lack of attitudinal change probably remains one of the greatest
challenges to the reform process. This is exacerbated by the fact that despite
efforts to improve conditions of service, pay and benefits for the rank and file
remains relatively low. With ever decreasing international support, the concern is
that invariably, old practices will start creeping back in. 
7.1 Personnel
Police discipline and honesty remains a huge issue. Nowhere is this more
apparent than in the traffic management department of the police who interface
with the public all day, every day. Accordingly, their (mis)conduct is amplified as
representative of the whole police force – evidenced by public perception surveys,
but it is more perception than reality, as police statistics show increasing numbers
of traffic fines being paid – indicating that traffic police are not being paid off to
turn a blind eye but are actually fining offenders and charging them to court. In
fact, the police bring significant amounts of money to the national coffers in the
form of accruals from fines. Furthermore, corrupt practices are no longer done
with impunity, or essentially condoned, as in the past. That they are a reality is
recognised by the police management, but it is fighting hard to address the
problem. There are severe repercussions for anyone caught taking bribes. Also,
there are now structures in place within the institution where people who are
aggrieved by unfair police practice can make complaints. 
While ensuring people are paid a living wage and improving conditions of service
are important aspects of rooting out corruption, the force is made up of human
beings who will have their frailties, and among them there will be people whose
attitudes, against all odds, remain unscrupulous. Also, rank and file police officers
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have had expectations raised over the years about improved conditions of service.
As funding runs out, however, these expectations may have to be lowered once
more, which could have knock-on effects and cause some officers to revert to the
unprofessional behaviour that once characterised the force.
Police training tries to play its part – extensive courses are taught on ethics.
However, whether this becomes internalised depends on the cadre of the
individual being taught, and this also, despite stricter eligibility requirements,
remains problematic. Kamara (2005: 12) states that
a good number of recruits have found their way into the organisation by
presenting fake documents indicating educational qualification and age… Yet
these people are allowed into the organisation because of influence and
cover-up by some unscrupulous personnel involved in the selection process. If
this situation is not closely monitored… the organisation will soon be
overwhelmed with a bunch of old semi-literates akin to the political era and
unfit for the demands of community policing.
Another problem regarding recruitment is the difficulty in attracting female
graduates from the universities and other tertiary institutions. Efforts to overcome
this include outreach programmes at universities and the accelerated female
graduate scheme, in operation since 2007. Similar to the Cadet Officer
Programme of the 1980s, they pass out from the Police Training School with the
rank of Sergeant and are fast-tracked through promotions. 
7.2 Budgetary constraints
Maintaining a commitment to the range of reforms discussed above and
continuing their spread across the country, while ensuring adequate logistics and
infrastructure has colossal financial implications. While much of the financial
burden of reform has been carried by DFID, including paying for consultancy
services, there is a big question as to what happens when donor funding runs out,
which apart from for particular activities – such as providing support for policing
elections – it is more or less doing. This is in a context where the police needs to
grow from its current capacity of 9,500 to a 12,000-strong force to ensure
effectiveness.
As largely negative public perceptions (e.g. Vincent 2008) indicate, it has been a
real challenge to manage the public’s expectations, given the level of public
engagement, rolling out of programmes and the contracting of finances. Senior
police officers feel that the force is being judged against the background of Biddle.
During his time the force was inundated with resources that allowed the police to
be professional in both its outlook and its service delivery. The eight years since he
left have coincided with donor fatigue, or donor diversion to other areas, both within
Sierra Leone, and to war-torn post-conflict countries elsewhere in greater need of
assistance. The reduced assistance to the organisation has started having an
impact on both its professionalism and its ability to respond to crimes.
Other challenges arising from the lack of funds is the force’s capacity to actually
fight crime, particularly the more sophisticated forms of criminality it is increasingly
faced with, such as cybercrime; money laundering; drug smuggling; and human
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trafficking. The force continues to lag behind in technological advancements,
including computer, forensic and CCTV technology (Kamara 2005), severely
affecting its abilities. Furthermore, limited funds make it difficult for the police to
address issues stemming from the recent history of conflict. This includes the
challenge of (among other things) the large number of disaffected, war-hardened
youth concentrated in the main cities and towns, who often resort to illegality to
fund their existence.
The public has assumed that a civilian-led government would be in a position to
provide the resources to enable the police to do its job. This has not been the
case, unfortunately. The government’s commitment to policing is not being called
into question but its capacity to fund its activities is. The government’s subvention
to the police has been dwindling but mostly because the government itself has
been grappling with its own revenues, meaning its assistance to the police has not
been very robust or timely, which impairs the force’s well-laid strategic plans.
There will definitely be a need to juggle budgetary allocations, and prioritise some
areas (e.g. training) over others (e.g. vehicle purchases). Alternative means of
raising revenue, such as the private hire of police services by businesses such as
banks are in place12 but these are potentially problematic (e.g. if conflicts of
interest arise). It is hoped that the government’s fortunes will soon change (e.g.
through recently agreed large mining contracts) to enable its financial commitment
to mirror its stated commitment to the aims of the police force.
7.3 The political environment
The above section notwithstanding, the IG continues to be appointed by the
President (although there is now wide consultation during this process) and
supervised by the Minister of Internal Affairs; the Police Council is chaired by the
Vice President; and the government controls the purse strings. While currently
there is little evidence of this, the set-up continues to provide the facility for a
corrupt political party, or individuals with oversight responsibilities, to levy undue
influence over the keeper of the SLP’s highest office. 
With the change of government (from SLPP to APC), there was some worry that
the police’s newly-acquired independence would be eroded, and when they came
in, some senior politicians tried to throw their weight around. But key ministers
such as the former Minister of Internal Affairs, Dauda Kamara were instrumental
(although ultimately unsuccessful) in trying to create an independent authority to
supervise the police, outside of government machinery. Although not yet a reality,
the proposal remains under review, and was even mentioned by the President in
a recent State Address. However, it remains a contentious issue, not just in or for
Sierra Leone, but also in other countries. After all, control over the use of force
remains a key sovereign function of the state. What is the wisdom then of putting
the police under the supervision of an independent authority?
In that case, it may be enough to ensure that the appropriate checks and
balances remain in place. So for instance, while the appointment of the IG and
their deputy are still political appointments, which may disfavour more
12 Lance Phoday, interview, 8 January 2011.
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experienced and capable AIGs who are not preferred by politicians, the
appointments are now made after wide-ranging consultations and there is no
longer scope for arbitrary appointments within the democratic system.
Nevertheless, a recent constitutional review recommended that the appointment of
the IG should be an independent from government. 
7.4 Problematic areas of reform
One problematic aspect of the way the reform in Sierra Leone took place is that it
focused on the police, largely in isolation – other institutions did not undertake the
process – so it was only recently for instance that prison reform was undertaken.
The JSDP has gone a long way in redressing this but the time lag has been
problematic for the successful performance of the police. 
A different problem stemming from the reform is that some changes were, and
remain, very unpopular. These include the reduced ranking structure, among
others. Brima Acha Kamara, who succeeded Biddle, continued his reforms lock,
stock and barrel. A new IG took over in August 2010, and perhaps the time has
come for the police to review, nearly ten years later, the impact and relevance of
the restructuring. The time has come for the police to review, nearly ten years
later, the impact and relevance of the restructuring. At the very least there is a
need to review what has worked for the organisation, and what more needs to be
introduced. For instance, the institution would benefit from reintroducing one rank
within the junior ranking structure, and another in the senior ranking structure, to
manage people’s expectations. 
8 Discussion and conclusions
Essentially, this paper has tried to tell a story about organisational change, from
the perspectives of senior Sierra Leonean officers who were in the middle of
efforts to see the change through, and who today have the responsibility of
maintaining it. It is hoped that the sharing of experience will be beneficial to
similar organisations contemplating or undertaking change.
Before the civil war corruption was rife within the police force and it was a highly
partisan enterprise. These aspects were reflected throughout public institutions
and were a core cause of the conflict. As a result of the conflict, the entire
institution fell into disarray. However, through the war, a few individuals had been
able to maintain a semblance of order. When international support teams arrived,
at the request of the newly democratically-elected government, they were able to
work with a core of dedicated officers, some of whom had fled the military junta.
Together, and with significant public input, they were able to identify some of the
problems within the organisation, including police excesses, nepotism, and
inconsistencies in recruitment and promotion. They took their findings, developed
a strategic development plan detailing where they wanted to go and started the
restructuring process. Various structures were then introduced, dealing with
external oversight, internal discipline, and community relations. Local Needs
Policing developed as the country’s answer to Community Policing, and is now a
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primary feature of the SLP’s approach. Today the SLP is a very different institution
from what it was at the end of the twentieth century.
What factors account for this change? While the focus here has been on the
police, it is also clear that without the context of a newly democratically-elected
regime, reform would have been a non-issue. The fact that the President had
previously sat on an Advisory Council of the police as part of the democratic
transition, and that his political platform was based on a policy of transparency
and good governance, meant that the changes were contextualised within the
wider democratising environment. The commitment towards supporting a well-
resourced police force, insulated from political machinations, which started with
the Kabbah government was restated under the APC government when it came to
power in 2007. 
It is also clear that a key factor of success was that those in charge were able to
take advantage of differing attitudes within the force to push through changes. A
core of well-educated, pragmatic but somewhat idealistic mid- and senior-level
officers seized the opportunity to realise a vision they had had of the police when
they joined many years before. 
Most of these officers were supported in their efforts by a strategic appointment of
a foreigner, Biddle, as the transitional head of the organisation. He was able to
make the most of the reform-minded to push through his agenda, while silencing
(at least momentarily) dissenting views. By pursuing a policy of rapidly promoting
people he considered competent and well-educated with little regard for age or
seniority in the organisation, he ensured that strategic positions were populated
by individuals sympathetic to, and supportive of, his agenda.
Furthermore, as the former head of the CPDTF, Biddle himself was regarded as
highly competent. He came from a country, the UK, towards which the majority of
Sierra Leoneans felt profound gratitude for essentially stabilising the country in
2000, and which seemingly had no other (for example economic) agenda.
Importantly, he was insulated from the rampant neopatrimonial politics in the
country, which a Sierra Leonean counterpart would have found extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to isolate him or herself from. 
Biddle’s tenure has proved a useful precedent for the IGs who have had to follow
in his footsteps, and the officers he left in his place remain committed to the
reform agenda. The organisation is now led by a Sierra Leonean IG, supported by
an Executive Management Board, which aims to ensure that whatever was
achieved during the reform period is maintained and improved upon. This
relatively democratic structure ensures that a single person is no longer
responsible for making day-to-day decisions about the direction of the force, and
there are systems in place to disseminate information and monitor progress.
Central to the reform was the introduction of the concept of Local Needs Policing,
a form of Community Policing, considered particularly relevant for the Sierra
Leone context (as Boxes 3.1–5.1 illustrated). Every effort was made to get the
Sierra Leone citizenry ‘on side’, which essentially involved a massive rebranding
and public relations exercise to inform and engage the public. 
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These efforts were supported by external expertise and the provision of resources
sustained over a good number of years (from 1998 to present, albeit now in much
reduced form). External funding also provided support for staff welfare and
development, including training abroad for senior staff, the rehabilitation of police
infrastructure (including stations, barracks and prisons), logistics, the creation of
specialised departments such as the FSU, and so on. 
However, significant challenges remain. Several public perception surveys (e.g.
Vincent 2008) have shown that while the public does think the police force has
improved, it is still widely considered a corrupt institution. As much as the
restructuring has been embraced, there are still officers who have refused to
change. At the same time, some members of the public are still on the fence – not
everybody appreciates the police (sometimes, they feel – no matter what they do!).
As with any war, there is always the aftermath to contend with. High rates of
unemployment, particularly among young people, means high crime rates to deal
with, community conflicts and so on. Furthermore, detractors worry that not enough
has changed, and in fact the ground that has been won is already being eroded.
With ever-decreasing sources of funding will progress be completely erased?
Senior police officers assert that they are working hard to ensure that they provide
the necessary services, and will continue to do so, as long as essential funding is
forthcoming. The government’s role is therefore vital. Public security needs to be a
priority of the government. While it is understandable that the government is
squeezed, security provision is something that must not be compromised. A
positive note however, is that lack of funds notwithstanding, the government’s
commitment to the process has been maintained. Despite the change in the
governing party there is official commitment to maintaining the police’s operational
independence. The expectation therefore is that at such time as funds begin to
flow freely so the government’s disbursement to the police will increase
accordingly. In the meantime the police continues to do its bit and recognises that
it still needs to continue working hard to ensure that Sierra Leone remains a
peaceful and stable country.
Finally, the Sierra Leone experience shows the need for reform to be a society-
wide endeavour. Without a holistic change, very little will change. This is most
apparent with regard to one of its major persistent problems facing the police:
corruption. The reality is that problems of corruption spread far beyond the
institution itself. The problem is society-wide – one could almost label it a cultural
problem, pervading homes, families, churches, schools etc, and tackling it
requires a holistic approach. In 2008, the government adopted an official national
policy of ‘Attitudinal Change’. The public must accept the role it has played in
facilitating corruption among the Police, which reinforces the notion that improved
policing in Sierra Leone must be a community effort.
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Appendix A1: Sierra Leone Policing
Charter
Introduction
‘My Government wants to create a police service which will be a credit to the nation.’
The role of the police
The Sierra Leone Police will return our communities to peace and prosperity by
acting in a manner which will:
? Eventually remove the need for the deployment of military and para-military
forces from our villages, communities and city streets
? Ensure the safety and security of all people and their property 
? Respect human rights of all individuals
? Prevent and detect crime by using the most effective methods which can be
made available to them
? Take account of local concerns through community consultation 
? At all levels be free from corruption.
Equal opportunities
The personnel policies of the Sierra Leone Police will be the same for all
members, regardless of sex or ethnic origin. All recruitments, trainings, postings,
promotions and opportunities for development will be based on a published equal
opportunities policy.
The role of the Government
The Government will do all in its power to ensure that the Sierra Leone Police is:
? Directed and managed in accordance with the Constitution
? Locally managed so as to ensure that the community views are always taken
into consideration
? Adequately resourced and financed 
? Well-equipped to undertake its duties 
? Professionally trained 
? Dynamically led, and 
? That the terms and conditions of service for members of the Sierra Leone
Police reflect the importance of the task they perform.
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The role of the people
In order that our Police Officers can successfully fulfil our expectations, it is
essential that all people of Sierra Leone help and support them at all times.
Conclusion
Our aim is to see a reborn Sierra Leone Police, which will be a ‘Force for Good’ in
our nation.
Source: Sierra Leone Police website,
www.police.gov.sl/content.php?p=6&pn=Objectives (accessed 3 August 2011).
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Appendix A2: Sierra Leone Police
Mission Statement
Consultation took place as a response to the Policing Charter amongst Senior
Officers of the Sierra Leone Police Force. From this consultation, a four-part
Mission Statement was produced by the Sierra Leone Police.
Our duty
We will provide a professional and effective service which:
? Protects life and property
? Achieves a peaceful society
? Takes primacy in the maintenance of law and order 
Our values
? We will respect human rights and the freedoms of the individual
? We will be honest, impartial, caring and free from corruption
Our priorities
? We will respond to local needs
? We will value our own people
? We will involve all in developing our priorities.
Our aim
? To win public confidence by offering reliable, caring and accountable police
service.
We all have a part to play. If a single Police Officer receives a few thousand
Leones bribe to allow a traffic offender to escape prosecution, or takes advantage
of his position as a Police Officer, it reflects on all of us. Furthermore, such actions
are a criminal offence. By adhering to our values, we will win the respect of the
public; thereby achieving our aim.
By working together we can truly become a ‘Force for Good’.
43
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 70
References
Afrol (2002) Female Genital Mutilation Election Issue in Sierra Leone,
Misanet.com/IPS, 11 May 2002, www.afrol.com/News2002/sil010_fgm_elections.htm
(accessed 26 July 2011)
Albrecht, P. (2010) Transforming Internal Security in Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone
Police and Broader Justice Sector Reform, DIIS Report 2010.7, Copenhagen:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Albrecht, Peter and Jackson, Paul (2009) Security System Transformation in Sierra
Leone, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform and International
Alert, www.ssrnetwork.net/publications/security_s.php  (accessed 26 July 2011)
Alpha, Morie (2010) ‘The APC Commission of Nonsense’, 15 July, Sierra Express
Media www.sierraexpressmedia.com/archives/11330 (accessed 26 July 2011)
Baker, Bruce (2006) ‘The African Post-conflict Policing Agenda in Sierra Leone’,
Conflict, Security and Development 6.1, April
—— (2005) ‘Who do People Turn to for Policing in Sierra Leone?’, Journal of
Contemporary African Studies 23.3, September
Ball, Nicole; Biesheuval, Piet and Olanisakin, Funmi (2007) Security and Justice
Sector Reform Programming in Africa, Evaluation Working Paper 23, London and
Glasgow: DFID 
Biesheuvel, Piet; Hamilton-Baillie, Tom and Wilson, Peter (2007) Sierra Leone
Security Sector Reform Programme, Output to Purpose Review,
http://s4rsa.wikispaces.com/file/view/Sierra+Leone+Security+Sector+Reform+
Programme.doc (accessed 26 July 2011)
Bøås, Morten (2003) ‘Weak States, Strong Regimes: Towards a “Real” Political
Economy of African Regionalization’, in J. Andre Grant and Fredrik Söderbaum
(eds), The New Regionalism in Africa, The International Political Economy of New
Regionalisms Series, Aldershot: Ashgate
—— (2001) ‘Liberia and Sierra Leone – Dead Ringers? The Logic of
Neopatrimonial Rule’, Third World Quarterly 22.5: 697–723
Charley, Chris J.P. (2008) ‘Policing Post-conflict Countries: The Sierra Leone
Experience’, in Police and Policing in West Africa, proceedings of a regional
conference, Lagos: CLEEN Foundation
—— (2002) ‘The SLP’s Organisational Transformation from a Quasi-Political
Adjunct to a Modern Democratic Policing Apparatus’, unpublished paper
—— (1999) ‘The Sierra Leone Police “A Force in Distress?”’, unpublished paper
Clapham, Christopher (1985) Third World Politics: An Introduction, London:
Croom Helm
Conteh, Jacob S. (2010) Inspector General Munu’s Appointment Signals a New
Direction for Sierra Leone, 21 August 2010, www.cocorioko.net/?p=1683
(accessed 26 July 2011)
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 70
44
DFID (2004) Sierra Leone Justice Sector Development Programme: Project
Memorandum, 4 April, London: Department for International Development
Doyle, Mark (1999) British Clean-up for Sierra Leone Police, BBC News Thursday
25 November, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/536233.stm (accessed 
26 July 2011)
Fakondo, Kadi K. (2009) ‘Gender Based Violence: The Effects of Domestic
Violence on the Women of Sierra Leone: A Case Study of Eastern Freetown’,
unpublished Masters Dissertation
Gbla, O. et al. (2009) Sierra Leone: A Country Review of Crime and Criminal
Justice, 2008, ISS Monograph 160, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/104313/ipublicationdocument_
singledocument/379d2dbd-dc59-4c43-8429-5a816f7e3700/en/M160FULL.pdf
(accessed 5 August 2011)
Kamara, A. (2005) ‘Future Challenges facing the Sierra Leone Police’, essay
presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for promotion to the rank of AIG,
unpublished paper
Mackenzie, Simon and Henry, Alistair (2009) Community Policing: A Review of
the Evidence, Scottish Government Social Research, www.scotland.gov.uk/
Resource/Doc/292465/0090209.pdf (accessed 26 July 2011) 
Meek, Sarah (2003) ‘Policing Sierra Leone’, in Mark Malan, Sarah Meek,
Thokozani Thusi, Jeremy Ginifer and Patrick Coker, Sierra Leone, Building the
Road to Recovery, ISS Monograph 80, Cape Town: Institute for Security Studies
NPRC (1994) Advisory Council Notes No. 12 dated 9th May 1994
Office of the Inspector General of Police (2008) Sierra Leone Police: 2009–2011
Strategic Plan, Sierra Leone Police Headquarters, September
Richards, P. (2005) ‘To Fight or to Farm? Agrarian Dimensions of the Mano River
Conflicts (Liberia and Sierra Leone)’, Africa Affairs 104/417: 571–90
Sierra Leone Police (2008) Sierra Leone Police  2009–2011 Strategic Plan:
Attaining Another Level – A Professional Accountable Force, Freetown: Office of
the Inspector General of Police
—— (1998) A Mission Statement: A Force for Good, Freetown: Office of the
Inspector General of Police
Vincent, James B.M. (2008) Perception Survey of the Security Sector Reform
Process in Sierra Leone, Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone, 1999–2007
Paper No. 12, edited by Paul Jackson, and Peter Albrecht
45
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 70
Security in an Africa of Networked,
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